The first seventy-two hours after a disaster are not an information environment. They are chaos: no power, no cell service, no roads, no roster of who needs what. Large institutions are built to operate on the far side of that chaos — after the assessment, after the declaration, after the contract. Somebody has to work inside it.
That is the job Ground Force built itself to do. We deploy volunteers into impacted communities in two-week shifts to form a disaster safety net, and we hold that net in place long after the news cycle moves on. In Lake Charles we stayed a year. In Houma we stayed six months. In Mayfield we stayed through Christmas Day, tarping roofs. Our commitment is to elderly and vulnerable people — the residents who cannot dig themselves out, and who are still there when everyone else has gone.
Being fast has a specific operational meaning here. It means an advance team in Houma within twelve hours of Ida passing. It means boots on the ground in Lahaina seventy-two hours after the fire. It means arriving in Mayfield less than forty-eight hours after an EF4 crossed eleven counties. And being fluid means that when we got to Maui and found a local business owner already running a carline at three hundred vehicles a day, we did not build a competing operation — we taught his team our system and the line ran twelve hundred the next day.
“There is no other organization in the disaster space that leverages technology in the manner that Ground Force does… your approach ensures the ability to immediately deploy and begin distributing products to survivors of disaster, while other organizations are still working out what to bring and where to go.”
Jim Alvey · VP of Disaster Recovery, Good360
What the numbers below actually measure
These reports are assembled from primary sources: SAFE Camp daily logs, our own volunteer-hour logs, AmeriCorps NCCC project completion reports, grant reporting, donor letters, and correspondence with the partners who were standing next to us. Where a figure exists, it is cited. Where it does not, we say so plainly rather than estimate — three deployments in this record have no verified service metrics at all, and marking that honestly is more useful to a funder than a manufactured number.
The record is also uneven by design, and the unevenness tells its own story. Our largest, best-documented responses are the ones where a foundation was already at the table. Our thinnest are the ones we self-funded out of small-donor money raised during the storm itself — Panama City ran on three thousand dollars from two donors and still delivered nearly forty thousand in value. We have been under-capitalized, not under-performing, and the gaps in this document are the shape of that problem.
“Everywhere we go, we have an absolutely INCREDIBLE impact but the general philanthropic groups and donors don’t really know, because we have not been going to them for funding… But it’s BIG and we need to communicate it to people who can fund us.”
Rob Gaudet · Founder & President, January 2024
And it is all on video. More than 1,000 LIVE videos and 25,000 posts were recorded in the field as the work happened, unedited. Where a deployment has a video record, it is linked directly from that entry below — and the complete archive is public.
One capability sits underneath all of it, and it is the reason a small Louisiana nonprofit consistently out-delivers organizations many times its size: we convert an audience of tens of millions into physical goods and human hands, in hours. That mechanism is set out next; the five programs it powers follow after.